Tenho lido muita coisa sobre o assunto General Motors mas as opiniões revelam-se bastante contraditórias.

Uns (os optimistas) dizem que os que acreditam na falência são pouco patriotas e que menosprezam a força do povo Americano, o aumento das vendas da Chevrolet, que existem 19 bilhões de USD em "cash" no balanço, etc...

Outros (os pessimistas) argumentam que a situação a que chegou a GM não tem retorno, que os custos fixos com pensões, cuidados de saúde são imcomportáveis a médio/longo prazo e que os optimistas, ao lembrarem os 19 bilhões USD em "cash" no balanço esquecem-se das várias dezenas de bilhões de USD de dívida que existem do outro lado do balanço e que essa dívida rebenta com qualquer empresa, etc...

Antunes

Bom dia Antunes,

Tomei a liberdade de colocar este tópico como inamovível para que não se perca com tempo.  Além disso, se não te importares estava a pensar destacá-lo na homepage para fomentar a participação na sondagem. Pode ser? 


Um abraço e um ponto,

Bom dia Francisco,

Claro que não me importo e agradeço esse privilégio. 

Acerca de General Motors, aqui fica o último artigo que li sobre a situação:

"General Motors

Perhaps the inevitable General Motors bankruptcy will be the straw that breaks the camel's back. (Accounts managed by Harch Capital Management, Inc. are short both General Motors stock and bonds.) On February 16, 2006, The Wall Street Journal ran an article entitled "GM Debt Poses Challenge to Derivatives Market." "The car maker has about $30 billion in debt. Traders estimate more than $200 billion in credit derivatives are linked to GM. But because such derivatives don't trade on an exchange, nobody knows for certain how much credit default swap protection has actually been written on GM. And nobody can say with confidence that they even know who is on the other side of the trades that they have entered into. Such uncertainty is one reason that, since last year, regulators have asked participants in the fast-growing market to get their operational act together. That encompasses everything from dealing with a backlog of unconfirmed trades to figuring out who their counterparties are when one side transfers contracts to another party...Four years ago, the derivatives market was a fraction of the size of the underlying corporate bond market. Today, it is estimated at $12.5 trillion, more than twice the underlying market's size, and it continues to expand rapidly."

Bill King's view? "The Street better hurry and finalize an agreement to settle GM CDS for cash. If the derivatives market exacerbates a possible GM bankruptcy by some multiple, the numbskulls up on Capital Hill will be forced to act. And those numbskulls will act indignant and assert that they were unaware or misled. And they will look to demonize somebody because the system[ic] problems caused by derivatives could be a multiple of the problem caused by a GM bankruptcy." (The King Report, February 23, 2006) The wise men in Congress may squawk all they want, but they will not be able to say with any credibility that they weren't warned about a GM bankruptcy. Moreover, they may try to point the finger at others, but the policy failures that will have been partially responsible for this sad ending must be laid right at their doors: failed energy policies; failed pension and healthcare policies; failed industrial policies.

And sure enough, another warning was sounded on February 21, 2006, when Moody's Investors Service dropped GM's credit ratings another notch further into junk territory and expressed concern about GMAC's stand-alone rating. Joining Standard & Poors, which had already used the "B" word, Moody's warned that GM could face bankruptcy if it is unable to reduce its costs. "The downgrade reflects increased uncertainty that the company will be able to achieve all of the steps necessary to establish a competitive wage, benefit and supplier cost structure outside of bankruptcy...Moody's remains concerned that in the absence of material progress in reducing its UAW-related cost burden through negotiations, GM could resort to bankruptcy as an option to reduce this burden." GM should heed Moody's warning, and do it sooner rather than later. The unions are going to play this situation out as long as they can, and in the end the result is going to be the same -- the "B" word.

Moody's warning was hardly surprising. A little more unexpected, perhaps, was what the rating agency had to say about GMAC. In a separate statement, Moody's said that the finance company's stand-alone credit rating had weakened from the investment grade level to the mid-Ba level -- a less-than-investment-grade rating. As our readers undoubtedly know, GM has been trying to sell GMAC for many moons, and a transaction announcement has been imminent for so long that it has given the word "imminent" a bad name. The import of Moody's statement, however, was that its analysis of a post transaction, stand-alone GMAC would begin at the lessthan- investment grade level, which could pose a serious obstacle to a transaction that was initially designed to preserve GMAC's investment grade rating and protect the finance arm's rating from GM's deteriorating auto manufacturing business. As one Moody's analyst put it: "The longer the process takes, the more evident it seems that the deal challenges come to the fore." That's another way of saying that when it rains, it pours. In the days after this announcement, GMAC's bonds traded down to a four-month low as investors grew increasingly concerned that a sale of the unit would not restore its investment grade rating.

In the February 20, 2006 edition of Fortune ("The Tragedy of General Motors"), reporter Carol J. Loomis suggests that a GM bankruptcy will be a major event for the U.S. economy and, more importantly, for the U.S. psyche:
"It is the instinctive wish of most American businesspeople, even those unlikely to be directly affected, that General Motors not go bankruptcy. True, some people will say, 'They had it coming to them.' But the majority will be more practical, telling themselves that the company is so central to the economy, so sprawling in its commercial reach, that bankruptcy -- 'going into chapter,' as restructuring folks say -- is ominous almost beyond contemplation. And yet the evidence points, with increasing certitude, to bankruptcy....Bankruptcy isn't going to occur next week. But down the road -- say, past 2006 -- its probability is high."
A GM bankruptcy, which HCM views as inevitable (with Ford soon to follow), will be such a monumental psychological event because it will toll the death knell of the American industrial model. No longer will politicians and business leaders be able to defend a system that includes prohibitively expensive legacy costs (healthcare, pensions), uncompetitive union demands (i.e. work rules, uneconomic wage and benefit packages), and a dysfunctional tort system. It is obvious to a child of elementary school age that the system is broken; it is a true American tragedy that it is going to take the bankruptcy of an American business icon to force the point home. And even then, in today's political and economic system, there is no guarantee that anything more than a band-aid will be applied to the problem while America's industrial system is allowed to slide further into the abyss.

Typical of the "stick your head in the sand approach" approach to the problem is a recent article by Forbes writer Jerry Flint. In a column called "Bankruptcy, Shmankruptcy" (February 13, 2006), Mr. Flint writes: "Enough already on General Motors and bankruptcy. I am tired of the B-word. GM isn't going bankrupt this year. GM isn't going bankruptcy next year; 2008 is so far off that even Bill Gates could be bankrupt by then. It's dangerous to go three years out, but no. I wouldn't expect GM to go bankrupt in 2008, either." Mr. Flint's reasoning is, unfortunately, non-existent. He points to a turnaround at Chevrolet last year -- he reports that it outsold Ford last year. That's like saying that the second-to-last-place team beat the last place team. He points to the $19 billion of cash that the company has on its balance sheet, but he forgets to look at the left side of the balance sheet, where hundreds of billions of dollars of liabilities reside. Finally, he resorts to patriotism: "I've written this before and I'll write it once more. The graveyards, and the ocean bottoms, too, are full of men who underestimated American courage and determinism." HCM is as patriotic as the next guy, but it's going to take more than patriotism to save GM. It's also going to take more than $19 billion, especially when the company is losing billions of dollars a year. HCM is certain that Mr. Flint has the ability to remain optimistic far longer than our readers have the ability to remain solvent if they follow his advice. "

A grande consequência de uma eventual falência da GM tem a ver com o mercado de derivados.

Esta questão da falência da GM há muito tempo que é comentada, mesmo antes de essa possibilidade se tornar pública. Penso que as repercussões serão tão gravosas para o sistema financeiro que o governo norte-americano tudo fará para evitar a falência da GM. Uma das hipóteses é o governo assumir os custos com pensões e com a saúde dos funcionários da GM. Isso aliviaria enormemente a estrutura de custos da GM.

Em termos de sobrevivência nesta indústria super competitiva, a GM (e também a Ford) terá forçosamente que reformular toda a sua gama de produtos fazendo com que a sua dependência em relação aos SUV's seja substancialmente reduzida.

Quanto à votação, sinceramente não sei o que pensar. A situação da GM é muito grave. Talvez por isso mesmo a intervenção estatal seja inevitável. Lembro que em situações anteriores que implicavam uma influência muito negativa no mercado de derivados houve intervenção do estado norte-americano. Vamos ver é se a GM não é grande demais para uma hipotética operação de salvamento.

Penso que por si só a GM pode afectar o mercado de forma dramática. Mas tudo vai depender da actuação do governo em caso de crise. A questão é que a GM não é um caso isolado. Quando o mercado inverter será por variadíssimas razões, sendo que a principal terá a ver com uma redução de liquidez no sistema (que poderá ter como causa primordial a falência da GM).

Paciente,

Exactamente. O problema é que se a GM afundar leva consigo bilhões de dólares investidos em derivados de crédito. Poderá ser o governo ou, mais provavelmente na minha opinião, a FED a actuar...

Já agora se puderes explicar melhor o que são esses derivados de crédito para o commun dos mortais perceber melhor em que consiste esse instrumento (eu tenho apenas uma vaga ideia)... 

Um abraço,

Antunes

é um negocio a Warren Buffet. Compra barato, toda a malta a dizer que vai falir, patati,patata....

GM é General Motors. Com os gestores certos, Buffet compra hoje e os netos deles vão vender.

Cumps

Amigo ppbogos,

Porque será que o Buffet não pega nela? Aliás, esse grande investidor comentou não há muito tempo que GM e Ford é para evitar. O Buffet compra empresas que estão baratas mas que possuem bons fundamentais (empresas com aquilo a que ele chama de "valor"). Não compra empresas falidas.

Antunes,

Quanto aos derivados, é muito complicado explicar como tudo funciona. Tu não percebes mas eu também não tenho conhecimentos suficientes para te explicar este negócio dos derivados financeiros. É um autêntico imbróglio e as sua ramificações e variantes são imensas.

Mas uma coisa eu sei: este mercado não é regulamentado o que não dá grande segurança e transparência. Por outro lado, a inversão da yield curve está a deixar muito boa gente com o coração nas mãos. É que um dos pressupostos para este mercado funcionar é o de haver um diferencial positivo nas taxas de juro, o que neste momento não acontece.

Short em GM até aos 5 Euros, depois logo se vê!!

Cenário mesmo muito negro... só vejo uma fuga: falencia e reestruturaçao da empresa...

By David Wigan
Reuters
Tuesday, March 28, 2006

LONDON -- Like the elephant in the living room, the decline of General Motors is a problem that investors don't want to think about but can't ignore.

The world's largest automaker, whose debt is close to the gross domestic product of Belgium, lost more than $10 billion last year and is facing a bankruptcy that would reap devastation in the financial markets.

GM's share price has halved in the past year, while its $100 billion of bonds have been cut to junk, confronting investors with the prospect of never getting their money back. Others in the highly-leveraged derivatives market face incalculable losses should a bankruptcy occur.

"A GM default would be absolutely huge," said Jonathan Loredo, of credit manager Cairn Capital. "It would be the biggest thing to hit the market in terms of losses and operational stress."

There is no understating the scale of GM's problems. It is losing market share in the United States, has $300 billion of long-term debt, provides health benefits to 1.1 million people (at the rate of about $1,500 per car produced), is threatened with a strike by its largest supplier, which is bankrupt, and is being investigated by the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Few who invest do not have some level of exposure -- GM stock and debt are held by the biggest investment banks and smallest retail buyers.

GM, or its financing arm GMAC, is present in around 65 percent of synthetic collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), according to Standard & Poor's, and underlies an estimated $1 trillion of default swaps.

The company's impact is evidenced by the CDX credit default swap indices. The U.S.-based CDX4 equity tranche, containing GM, trades at 36 points up front; the same tranche in series 5, without GM, costs 27.5 points. One firm out of 125 accounts for almost a third of the premium.

All that for a company with a market capitalization of $12.8 billion.

Still, investors struggle to judge whether the automaker, which sells 21 percent of cars in the United States, will ultimately perish.

"A bankruptcy filing is unlikely this year," said Christophe Boulanger, auto analyst at Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein. "Unless Delphi goes on strike -- in which case they would stop production and it would all be over."

Parts supplier Delphi, which filed the biggest bankruptcy in U.S. automotive history in October, is negotiating with the United Auto Workers union and GM over wage and benefit issues, with a strike threatened if there is no settlement.

Should a strike be called, GM could be bankrupt by June, Boulanger said. After that any scenario might play out, but the status of GMAC will be crucial.

GMAC has traded at a premium to its parent in the credit markets on hopes a controlling stake will be sold, ring-fencing the company and possibly returning it to investment grade. Yet despite GM's best efforts, no buyer has emerged.

Further complicating the outlook, if GMAC is not sold and GM does go bankrupt, it is uncertain GMAC would be consolidated in the filing.

For bond investors, a GM bankruptcy would be hard, but a GMAC bankruptcy would be disastrous. GMAC is home to three quarters of the group's bonds and is found in a large proportion of outstanding synthetic CDOs.

"The high degree of portfolio overlap between synthetic CDO transactions sets this asset class apart," said Standard & Poor's analyst Andrew South. "A rating action on GM could have a widespread effect on many CDOs."

The complex market in CDO squared, or CDOs of CDOs, also faces significant risk following a GM downgrade, one London-based hedge fund manager said.

"To be blunt -- it would be carnage," he said.

Part of that carnage would be in the back offices of financial institutions, which will have literally millions of transactions to unwind, and banks are already under regulator pressure over backlogs in credit derivatives.

Of course, the best possible outcome may also be the most likely. That is, GM will survive.

Having spent around $15 billion renewing its product offering, it is certain that the company will do everything in its power to avoid bankruptcy, Boulanger said.

There are positive signs on negotiations with unions, a cap on salaried retirees' health care at 2006 levels, and 30,000 job cuts planned.

Further, the precedents are good. In 1980 Chrysler stepped back from the brink, while Nissan Motor performed a similar feat 20 years later.

Ultimately it is probably investors who are best placed to judge GM's prognosis, and the cost of one-year default protection on GM is currently higher than five-year protection.

In other words, if the elephant is still in the room in 18 months, you can probably ignore it.

Obrigado Paciente.

Há uma coisa que, quanto a mim, é óbvia: a GM é mal gerida porque depender de 1 só fornecedor (Delphi) é um erro de gestão daqueles básicos (que vem na maior parte dos livros da especialidade...).

Quanto a mim a grande diferença entre a GM e a Enron é que nesta última houve má fé ao ocultar a realidade até às últimas consequências. No caso da GM há pelo menos o reconhecimento do problema e a consequente tentativa de corrigir a situação. Isso é importante!

Já agora aqui fica outro artigo sobre a recente proposta de reestruturação da GM aos seus trabalhadores:

"Take The Money And Run?
Jonathan Fahey, 03.22.06, 4:15 PM ET

New York -
General Motors has sold millions of vehicles over the past five years by enticing buyers with cash rebates. Now it is using cash to try to shoo thousands of workers off its payroll.

Here's the offer: $35,000 for Delphi and General Motors workers who have put in 30 years or more of service and are therefore eligible for retirement. Pensions and health care benefits will kick in immediately. There are a handful of other plans that include various levels of health care and pension benefits for those who haven't put in the full 30 years.

But there is another, more intriguing option, offered to GM workers only: A buyout of $140,000 for those with ten or more years of service or $70,000 for those with less than ten years who agree to quit, provided the worker gives up GM's gold-plated retiree health care plan. Pension benefits stay the same.

Will GM workers take it? Should they?

The buyout plan was announced today as part of an agreement between GM, the United Auto Workers (UAW) and Delphi, GM's one-time parts subsidiary that is now in bankruptcy. The idea is that GM and Delphi will both drastically reduce their bloated workforces and emerge leaner and better able to compete.

"This attrition plan is a big component of our turnaround program," says GM spokesman Jerry Dubrowski. "It will result in lower structural costs."

Delphi says 13,000 of its workers will be eligible for buyouts. While the buyout plan relieves pressure facing Delphi and the UAW, the two sides still have to agree on ongoing wages and benefits for the workers that remain.

Because GM is offering plans to all of its hourly workers, 100,000 autoworkers will have a choice to make. For some of the 36,000 that have put in their 30 years, a $35,000 payout and full benefits will be impossible to resist. Others will choose to keep earning their full pay and retire when they are ready.

But for those who have less than 30 years, for those who have a spouse with good insurance or for those who want to keep working and are confident they can find a job with health insurance, maybe it makes sense to take the $70,000 or $140,000 and give up GM's health care.

The average age of a GM worker is about 50. That means he or she has 15 years before Medicare kicks in. According to eHealthinsurance.com, a service that matches individuals with insurers, a 50-year-old Detroiter would have to pay, on average, $3,700 per year for a low-deductible plan for a married couple, assuming health care premiums will grow 8% per year. That makes for a total of about $55,000. A no-deductible plan, like the one GM offers its retirees, would cost $211,000 over 15 years.

Assuming workers would earn interest on the buyout money and use a health savings account to save on deductible and out-of-pocket expenses, they could come out ahead by the time Medicare kicks in, depending on the plan they choose. "If the couple is healthy and they are insurable, I think they can make money off this deal," says Robert Healy, vice president for customer care at eHealthinsurance.com.

On the other hand, cautioned Healy, if one of the couple had, say, a heart attack in their 40s and is uninsurable, it just isn't worth the risk.

For those workers or for others who want the peace of mind of being looked after by the world's biggest private insurer, it could be worth staying with GM's plan.

But there's yet one more thing to consider; this buyout deal does not guarantee that GM will become a successful company again. GM had a loss of $10.6 billion last year and will almost certainly end this year deep in the red. If it has to seek bankruptcy protection, an option GM says it is not considering, the court could cancel GM's retiree health care plan altogether.
"



Um abraço,

Antunes

GM may announce sale of GMAC stake Monday: sources
Automaker needs the $11 billion the sale could bring, but deal could still fall through.
April 2, 2006: 8:13 PM EDT


NEW YORK (Reuters) - General Motors Corp. may announce as soon as Monday a decision to sell a controlling stake in General Motors Acceptance Corp., its financial services business, for about $11 billion, sources familiar with the situation said on Sunday.

A consortium that includes hedge fund Cerberus Capital Management LP and the private equity unit of Citigroup (Research) is viewed as a front runner for the GMAC stake.

Cerberus may also secure some funding to help buy the GMAC stake from its portfolio firms, including Aozora Bank Ltd. of Japan, the sources said. Japan's Norinchukin Bank may also join the Cerberus consortium.

An investor group led by private equity firm Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. was still interested in the GMAC stake, but the sources said the Cerberus group has been leading the chase.

The sources said the GM board was meeting on Sunday to consider a possible GMAC stake sale.

GM (Research) said in October it wanted to sell a controlling stake in GMAC to a strategic partner in order to restore the financing unit's credit rating to investment-grade status.

However, the sale of the stake has proved a complicated process and sources stressed on Sunday that efforts to structure a deal could yet prove unsuccessful.

GM on Tuesday filed its delayed annual report, restating financial results for several years. GMAC warned there was no guarantee GM would succeed in selling a majority stake in GMAC.

GM needs the cash
A sale of the controlling stake in GMAC would help generate much-needed cash for GM, which earlier this month said its massive 2005 loss was $10.6 billion -- $2 billion more than it had previously reported.

By comparison, GMAC, which provides automotive and commercial financing as well as mortgage and real-estate services, earned $2.8 billion last year.

If GM is unable to structure a deal for the controlling stake in GMAC, analysts say it may decide to sell GMAC's residential mortgage operation, ResCap, or another part of GMAC, instead.

Big financial firms and private equity groups have shown great interest in GMAC's businesses over the past year.

On March 23, a consortium of Kohlberg Kravis Roberts, Five Mile Capital Partners LLC and Goldman Sachs Capital Partners bought 78 percent of GMAC's commercial mortgage unit, GMAC Commercial Holding Corp., for $1.5 billion and assumed $7.3 billion in debt owed to GMAC.

In December, GMAC agreed to sell up to $20 billion in U.S. retail automotive assets to Scotia Capital, the investment banking unit of Bank of Nova Scotia (Research).

In July, Bank of America Corp. (Research) agreed to buy up to $55 billion in car loans from GMAC over five years.

The GMAC stake would be a major coup for Cerberus, named after the three-headed watchdog in Greek mythology that guards the gates of hell.

Cerberus made its name as a distressed asset buyer and has grown to become one of the largest hedge fund traders and buyout firms in the world.

Former U.S. Vice President Dan Quayle chairs Cerberus Global Investments, a unit of the New York-based firm.

Agora que o negócio GMAC está confirmado, eis mais um artigo de opinião interessante de Jerry Flint (da Forbes), um dos defensores da não falência por parte da GM mas bastante crítico - críticas com as quais me identifico - relativamente à gestão:

What About Bob?
Jerry Flint, 04.03.06, 2:30 PM ET

New York -
General Motors just announced it is selling 51% of GMAC, its moneymaking vehicle-financing arm, for $14 billion cash over three years, including $10 billion by the end of this year. The buyer is an investment group led by Cerberus Capital Management.

GM should pour every penny of the sale's proceeds into new vehicles and new technology. Unfortunately, it is likely that much of the money will go into what I call the burial fund--money to pay off workers to retire early and give up benefits; money to guarantee medical care; money for the infamous Jobs Bank that pays workers for years not to work.

In fact, the GMAC deal will probably encourage the United Auto Workers union to hang tough against Delphi, the giant parts maker. Delphi, once part of GM and still a significant GM supplier, is bankrupt and wants to cut pay and benefits drastically. GM is already chipping in to take some of the Delphi people back on its payroll. Supporting Delphi could eat up most of the proceeds from the GMAC sale.

Last week GM sold a piece of its GMAC mortgage business, and it recently sold or is selling its interests in Japanese automakers Suzuki, Fuji Heavy Industries' Subaru, and Isuzu Motors. In all, GM is picking up about $20 billion from these sales, including GMAC. That is pretty much the value of GM's common stock, so theoretically GM could take the money, buy back its stock and take the company private. Don't bet on it.

What happens now?

The key issue is still management. It is widely expected that some time this year, if there is no sign of a turnaround, Chairman and Chief Executive RickWagonerRick Wagoner will step down. Will GM replace Wagoner with a leader of the CarlosGhosnCarlos Ghosn type, someone who understands the auto business and can lead effectively? Or will it be another business-school M.B.A. from the financial side of the company, the type that has led GM so ineffectively for decades?

If it were up to me, Bob would be the new GM boss. Bob, of course, is RobertLutzRobert Lutz, GM's vice chairman in charge of global product development. He's responsible for the vast improvements we are beginning to see in GM vehicles.

Lutz knows the car business as no other American: He was an executive vice president at Ford Motor and president of Chrysler. In his younger days, he led the great BMW sales charge in Europe. He isn't a college-trained engineer--for which some snub him--but a self-taught car guy. He's Detroit's best, a hot driver who also owns a jet fighter and a helicopter, an ex-U.S. Marine fighter pilot and the best-looking 74-year-old I know.

Ah, there's the rub. He's 74.

One more little problem: Lutz is not a backstabber, and this is a business in which backstabbing is fine art. He's loyal to the core, and he won't push Wagoner down the stairs.

Lutz has run into some problems at GM, which is natural for someone who attracts the press like a rock 'n' roll god. In an age when public relations departments carefully coach and script every public word uttered by their chief executives, Lutz never learned how to be politically correct. Sometimes Lutz speaks with too much candor, such as the time last year when he called Pontiac and Buick damaged brands--which, of course, is the truth. Dealers thought Lutz wanted to kill Pontiac and Buick, and they went berserk. In fact, Bob was working hard to save those nameplates, but he was just being honest.

To help boost Pontiac, Lutz personally pushed through the Pontiac Solstice roadster, which is a sensation. Of course, the Lutz magic doesn't always work as planned. Another effort to give Pontiac some quick pizzazz, by importing a fast coupe from Australia and calling it a GTO, was less than a success. Right now, he is pushing global platforms, working to adapt European structures for cars here in America. We'll get an idea about whether that is a viable plan this fall when new European-type cars are built here as Saturn models. My guess: They'll revive the brand.

Lutz built the great team that saved Chrysler in the 1990s. He fought with the charismatic LeeIacoccaLee Iacocca, and they didn't love each other, but they were a team. His last great car battle at Chrysler was to bring out the PT Cruiser, which became immensely successful. Lutz was the obvious candidate to replace Iacocca when he retired, but Iacocca delayed his retirement. Anyway, no one whom Iacocca knew would ever be good enough for him. When Iacocca finally brought in BobEatonBob Eaton from GM to run Chrysler, Lutz became Eaton's loyal No. 2.

With the Daimler buyout of Chrysler, Lutz got rich--tens of millions rich--though it wasn't his decision to sell the company. He just couldn't sit still or play golf. He tried to save Exide, the battery maker, but when Wagoner asked Lutz for help, he was ready to carry the flag again, and he officially joined GM on Sept. 1, 2001.

His immediate effect on GM was electric. The company pushed out RonZarrellaRon Zarrella, the generally despised president of North American Operations, and junked its ridiculous product-development program, which had made real product development all but impossible. For the first time in ten years, car people began to have some leverage over the accounting and marketing people at GM.

Even with Lutz, GM is still struggling. I say that without Lutz, the company wouldn't have a chance. Today the product is improving, quality is up, designs are much better, the interiors are good and the fit and finishes are top flight. So far, there haven't been any "gotta have" cars--to use a Lutz term--but many of the new vehicles are at least moderately successful. The new big trucks are world class.

I'm not saying Lutz will become head of General Motors. But I'll tell you this: If he did, they'd have a "Semper Fi" leader who would say "follow me" and mean it. And people would follow him.

GM would come back--or go down fighting, not whimpering.

Moses was 120 when he led his people to the promised land.

So why not Bob?

Mais uma sobre a GM:

Still In The Junkyard
Liz Moyer, 04.03.06, 3:25 PM ET

New York -
General Motors' financing arm has a buyer but not a coveted investment-grade credit rating.

Instead, Standard & Poor's and Moody's Investors Service each see giving the new General Motors Acceptance Corp. a status of "speculative," or junk, grade, albeit the highest possible rung in that category.

That means it'll be more costly to GMAC to borrow funds to finance its loan engine than if the auto lender had climbed back to investment grade status, a perch it hasn't occupied since last spring.

"The best-case rating outcome" would be Ba1, where it is now, one notch below investment grade, said Moody's in a statement Monday, while S&P said it sees raising GMAC to BB+ from BB, still junk or speculative grade. Fitch, which has GMAC two rungs below investment grade, said the deal could lift its ratings, although not necessarily to investment grade.

And, Moody's points out, GMAC will still have substantial ties to GM , which is keeping a minority 49% stake, and thus has exposure to the outcome of GM's negotiations with its labor unions and bankrupt parts supplier Delphi. "It is unlikely that GMAC's ratings could rise to the investment grade level until GM's profile stabilizes or improves," Moody's said.

Reaching investment grade status was one of GM's prime motivations for seeking a buyer for its profitable financing arm in the first place. A group, led by distressed debt-specialist Cerberus Capital, has agreed to buy that 51% stake in a deal worth about $14 billion over three years.

The deal will lift GMAC's ratings above parent GM's, which have been sinking deeper into junk territory in light of ongoing accounting issues and the possible hit from labor unrest at Delphi. The consortium can call off the GMAC deal if GM's debt sinks below triple-C.

While selling the stake in GMAC has been one of Chief Executive RickWagonerRick Wagoner's strategic priorities, it will make his turnaround of GM more urgent and challenging. GMAC provided $2.5 billion in profits to its parent company last year at a time when its auto business was billions of dollars in the red. That dividend will be cut in half after the 51% stake is shed. GM has about $20 billion in free cash available, but it will have to start paying for buyouts it offered to more than 100,000 workers. It also faces pension and other costs.

In a regulatory filing last week, GM said accounting matters may prevent it from accessing a $5.6 billion standby line of credit, prompting at least S&P to raise the possibility of another downgrade. GM's debt is now two notches away from triple-C.

Wagoner, who has been under intense pressure to improve results at the money-losing automaker, said today that the GMAC deal was an "important milestone" that brings GM "significant liquidity to support our North American turnaround plan, finance future GM growth initiatives, strengthen our balance sheet and fund other corporate priorities."

Cerberus, a $16 billion hedge fund, is joined by Citigroup's investment bank and private equity arm and Japan's Aozora Bank. The consortium is paying $7.4 billion at closing, and there will be a $2.7 billion cash distribution from GMAC. GM is retaining $20 billion in lease and retail assets that will pay $4 billion over three years. The consortium is contributing $500 million in equity to GMAC as well.

Founded in 1992 by the reclusive former Drexel Burnham Lambert trader Stephen Feinberg, Cerberus has a long track record of investments in turnaround situations. Its chief operating officer, Mark Neporent, was a work-out specialist and partner at law firm Schulte, Roth & Zabel before joining the fund. He has also served as the co-chairman of WorldCom's bankruptcy creditors committee. In addition, Cerberus is the majority owner of Aozora Bank (the former Nippon Fudoson Bank).

Citi was the adviser to the consortium on the transaction and is also kicking in $25 billion in syndicated financing for GMAC. The debt includes $10 billion in asset-backed financing and $15 billion in credit. Citi is likely to retain $2.5 billion of the credit.

Of course, an initial junk rating isn't the end of it, and GMAC could make it back to investment grade, even shortly after the deal closes. GMAC Chief Executive EricFeldsteinEric Feldstein, who retains his job under the new ownership, said during a conference call that "we think we have a shot" at investment grade.

S&P analyst Robert Schultz says the current view of GMAC's credit status was tipped by the buyers.

A single, highly rated financial institution stepping in as a strategic buyer (say, Citi buying GMAC with dedicated intention to do auto lending as a business), as opposed to a consortium of investors, would have tipped the ratings agencies in favor of an investment grade rating, Schultz said.

"We are committed to a long-term partnership," Neporent said today.

GM results improve
Embattled carmaker reports operating profit excluding all special items, but net loss for another quarter.
By Chris Isidore, CNNMoney.com senior writer
April 20, 2006: 8:59 AM EDT


NEW YORK (CNNMoney.com) - General Motors Corp. finally got some good financial news, posting an operating profit in the first quarter excluding all special items.

The embattled automaker reported that it earned $152 million, or 26 cents a share, excluding all special items in the period, such as a $1 billion pre-tax charge related to an agreement to change health care coverage for hourly retirees and their families.

Still, the company reported an operating loss of $529 million, or 94 cents a share when it excluded most of the special items but included the health care charge. It was not immediately clear which numbers are accepted by analysts surveyed by earnings tracker First Call, who had a consensus forecast of a loss of 44 cents a share. The company lost $988 million, or $1.75 a share excluding special items in the year earlier period.

Shares of GM (Research), a component of the Dow Jones industrial average, gained 73 cents, or 3.5 percent, in pre-market trading on Inet following the company's earnings release.

Still, even with the improved results, the company continued to lose money on its core automotive operations, with the red ink coming from its North American unit.

The company said it had an adjusted loss of $721 million in the quarter from its auto operations, including $484 million of the health-care settlement charge. The rest of that health care charge is charged against corporate results because it applies to former GM employees at parts maker Delphi.

North American auto operations lost $946 million in the first quarter of 2006, including the health care charge. Still that was an improvement from the adjusted loss of $1.5 billion at that operation a year ago.

But the company's European operations returned to profitability, and profits improved in its other two regions -- Asian-Pacific and Latin America, Africa and the Middle East.

The company's results were lifted by continued strong results at its finance unit, GMAC, even though profits there slipped to $605 million from $728 million a year earlier. GM recently announced plans to sell just more than half of that unit, though, in an attempt to help it eventually return to an investment-grade credit rating.

"We're pleased to see the significant progress in our first-quarter results and in the implementation of all four elements of our North American turnaround plan," said GM Chairman and CEO Rick Wagoner in the company's statement. "And we remain focused on accelerating our return to profitability and cash generation."

But the company didn't give any target or guidance as to when it expected a return to profitability. One major issue still hanging over its future is whether GM can reach an agreement with Delphi and the United Auto Workers union to help the bankrupt parts company trim its labor costs and still keep the union there happy and on the job.

"There is clearly more work to be done," Wagoner said in the statement. "Our next key priority is to reach a consensual agreement with Delphi and its unions that makes sense for all of the parties. The agreement we recently reached with the UAW on the attrition program is a significant step in achieving this objective, but there is more important work to do."

The company's net loss for the period came to $323 million, or 57 cents a share, including all special items. It was the fifth straight quarter of net losses.

Automotive revenue at the company came to $43.2 billion, up from $37.3 billion a year earlier and significantly better than the First Call forecast of $39.4 billion. The company said its revenue per vehicle sold in North America was significantly higher in the quarter than a year ago due to the introduction of new models of its large SUV's.

"We are very pleased with the market's reaction to our launch products," said Wagoner's statement. "In the first three months of the year, our new products accounted for about 30 percent of our total sales -- more than double where we were a couple of years ago. We're especially encouraged by the early sales of the Chevrolet Tahoe, GMC Yukon, and Cadillac Escalade."

Total revenue at GM, including from GMAC, rose to a record $52.2 billion in the period, up from $45.8 billion a year earlier.

Fim da sondagem.

Relativamente às respostas possíveis, ganhou o "Não" com 48% das opiniões, ou seja, 12 votos.

Em 2ª posição, igualadas com 16% (4 votos cada) das opiniões estão as seguintes opiniões:

"Sim. Bolsas caiem por uns dias mas recuperam rapidamente."

"Sim. Sell-off maciço. Início de um mercado descendente."

Em 3ª posição, igualadas com 8% (2 votos cada) das opiniões estão as seguintes opiniões:

"Sim. Sem efeitos nas bolsas."

"Sim. Bolsas caiem durante várias semanas mas conseguem recuperar."

Por último, reunindo apenas 4% (1 voto) ficou a seguinte hipótese:

"Sim. Crash nas bolsas."


Mas, fazendo uma análise mais exaustiva da sondagem, verifica-se que até ganhou o "Sim" por margem escassa reunindo 13 votos (o "Sim" teve 4*2+2*2+1=13) contra 12 do "Não". Acontece que havia 5 formas distintas de votar no "Sim" e apenas uma forma de votar no "Não".


Em jeito de conclusão, penso que a sondagem revela muita incerteza em relação ao futuro deste ícone da indústria automóvel Americana com quase metade dos participantes optimistas e pouco mais de metade pessimista...

Abraço,

Antunes